

ImmoKAG Remuneration Policy

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	- Significance Threshold changed to group standard based on new FMA circular - Specification that employees in transaction management shall receive non-cash bonus parts		
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1. Preamble

The Company ERSTE Immobilien Kapitalanlagegesellschaft m.b.H. ("Company") wants to be an attractive employer where employees can develop, grow and engage. Performance of employees is recognized and shall be rewarded.

The Company believes in a balance between monetary and non-monetary rewards and in fixed and variable remuneration. The monetary and non-monetary rewards are linked with the values and strategies of the Company. Remuneration is either paid as fixed or variable remuneration; there is no third category of remuneration. Fixed remuneration reflects the relevant professional experience, competence and organizational responsibility of employees. Variable remuneration is based on performance and in exceptional cases on other conditions; variable remuneration provides incentives for prudent risk taking in the long term and for sound risk management.

This policy addresses all remuneration elements of reward except such as training, benefits in kind, health and safety and other similar benefits.

Equity is a key element of ImmoKAG's remuneration strategy and has an internal, an external and a diversity perspective. Internal equity means that employees should feel being rewarded fairly according to the relative value of their jobs within ImmoKAG. Employees engaged in similar jobs in different parts of our company should be rewarded equally. External equity means that ImmoKAG strives to reward employees competitively compared to those who are engaged in similar jobs in other organisations of the respective market and/or sector. Having a compensation structure based on competitive base pay is key.

All employees are entitled to fair and favorable working conditions with special focus on remuneration. In order to monitor and eliminate gender specific remuneration gaps, HR shall conduct an internal analysis on an annual basis and implement corrective measures to narrow gaps where they exist.

2. Overview of Roles and Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the supervisory board and the Remuneration Committee in respect of this policy are described in chapters 5 and 6.

Business functions are responsible for the design of variable remuneration schemes, commission based/retail incentive schemes in cooperation and in alignment with Human Resources and compliance functions.

The determination of the bonus pool for the Company is the responsibility of Human Resources. The Management Board approves the final bonus pool amount.

The Management Board determines role specific objectives, agrees complete individual performance scorecards with the members of the Remuneration Committee, defines the performance agreements with direct subordinates and evaluates performance of subordinates through multi-source feedback. The process of setting performance objectives is facilitated by Human Resources.

Malus and claw-back decisions are taken on a case by case basis by the Management Board, Human Resources and Compliance. In particular cases the Remuneration Committee can also be involved.

The identification of employees who are material risk takers is coordinated by Human Resources in cooperation with business, legal and risk management functions.

3. Scope

3.1 Company

This Remuneration Policy applies to the Company and all its branches.

3.2 Material Risk Takers

This Remuneration Policy is applicable to all employees and management board members of the Company and to any type of remuneration paid by the Company, to any amount paid directly by the AIF itself, including carried interest and performance fees, and to any transfer of units or shares of the AIF, made to the benefits of those categories of staff, including all board members, senior management, risk takers, employees with control functions and employees, who are in the same income bracket as the board members and risk takers on account of their total remuneration, whose activities have a significant impact on the risk profiles of the Company or the AIF managed by the Company.

For the application of the specific remuneration principles, the Company has defined its risk takers as follows ("Risk Takers"):

- 1) All members of the management board;
- 2) All supervisory board members

- 3) All other management functions;
- 4) All employees in ImmoKAG Control functions, regardless of the actual amount of variable remuneration received or the person's actual impact on the entity's/AIF's risk profile;
- 5) All employees within the Fund Management and Transaction Management departments.
- 6) Persons who have managerial responsibility for an employee who meets one of the criteria set out in points (1) to (5).
- 7) Employees with high remuneration, provided they have a material impact on the respective entity's / AIF's risk profile:
 - a) any staff member who is within the 0.3 % of the number of staff, rounded up to the next integer, who have been awarded the highest total remuneration in the preceding financial year;
 - b) any staff member who was in the preceding financial year awarded total remuneration that is equal to or greater than the lowest total remuneration awarded in that financial year to a member of board or senior management.
 - c) the employee has been awarded total remuneration of EUR 500 000 or more in the preceding financial year;

All other functions within the Company have no material impact on the risk profile of the Company and investment funds it manages.

4. Legal basis and supervisory regulations

The Company, being an international asset manager significantly engaged in the management of investment funds, is subject to the following regulations:

- 1) Article 11 and Annex 2 to Article 11 of Austrian Alternative Investment Fund Managers Act– "AIFMG";
- 2) Article 39b and Annex to Article 39b of Austrian Bankwesengesetz "BWG";
- 3) ESMA Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under AIFMD (ESMA/2013/232) of July 2013 – "ESMA GL AIFM Remuneration";
- 4) ESMA Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the UCITS Directive and AIFMD (ESMA/2016/411) of March 2016 – "ESMA GL UCITS V and AIFMD";
- 5) ESMA Guidelines on remuneration policies and practices (MiFID) of June 2013 (ESMA/2013/606) – "ESMA GL Remuneration MiFID";
- 6) FMA Circular in connection with problems concerning conflicts of interests of certain remuneration systems involving the ESMA GL Remuneration MiFID of April 2014 – "FMA Circular conflicts of interests";

- 7) 05/2022 FMA Circular in relation to Articles 39 para. 2, 39b and 39c BWG on Principles of Remuneration Policies and Practices (Recast June 2022)";
- 8) Article 13 and Annex 2 of Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive – "AIFMD".
- 9) Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (**SFDR**) - Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector

In the event that the Remuneration Policy deviates from national law, or if national law or interpretations of the national supervisory authority are stricter than the Remuneration Policy, the respective national law and the stricter regulations have to be applied.

5. Governance of remuneration

The supervisory board and the Remuneration Committee, of the Company adopt and periodically review the general principles of the remuneration policy, amend it if needed and are responsible for its implementation. The implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with legal requirements, regulatory provisions, policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the Company.

All relevant internal functions (i.e. internal audit, risk management, compliance, legal, human resources) work closely together and ensure that the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management.

5.1 Supervisory Board

The supervisory board is responsible for and maintaining the remuneration policy of the institution, and overseeing its implementation to ensure it is fully operating as intended.

The supervisory board may delegate responsibilities for remuneration-related topics to the Remuneration Committee. The supervisory board is kept fully informed of the activities the Remuneration Committee through formal reports, thereby providing it with an opportunity to have its views taken into account.

The supervisory board may, at any time, partially or fully withdraw the Remuneration Committee's responsibilities for remuneration-related topics.

The following topics remain the responsibility of the supervisory board and may not be delegated to the Remuneration Committee:

- Approval of the variable remuneration of the members of the Management Board.
- Approval of payments in relation to premature terminations of members of the Management Board.

6. Remuneration committee

According to Article 11 AIFMG, management companies that are significant in terms of their size or the size of the investment funds they manage, their internal organization and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities shall establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk ("Remuneration Committee").

The following specific elements shall be taken into account when determining whether or not to establish a Remuneration Committee:

- 1) whether the management company is listed or not;
- 2) legal structure of the management company;
- 3) number of employees of the management company;
- 4) management company's assets under management;
- 5) whether the management company is a UCITS management company and also an AIFM;
- 6) provisions of the services mentioned under Article 6(4) of the AIFMD.

When assessing whether or not a management company is significant, it should consider the cumulative presence of all the above mentioned factors.

Due to the fact that the Company would be significant with regard to the majority of those factors and given that the Company has decided to refrain from applying the principle of proportionality, the Company has decided to establish the Remuneration Committee within their supervisory board.

Authority of the Remuneration Committee

The Remuneration Committee operates under delegated authority from the supervisory board. The Remuneration Committee's chairperson reports to the supervisory board on the Remuneration Committee's proceedings after each meeting in the upcoming meeting of the supervisory board.

The Remuneration Committee is authorised to investigate and undertake any activity within the framework of its duties. The members are authorised to seek any information they properly require regarding any employee of the institution.

The Remuneration Committee is authorised to obtain appropriate external advice to assist it in the performance of its duties and to secure the services of outsiders with relevant experience and expertise and to invite those persons to attend at meetings of the committee¹. The cost of

¹ The Remuneration Committee is autonomously responsible for establishing the selection criteria, selecting, appointing and setting the terms of reference for any remuneration consultants who advise the Remuneration Committee and/or respective Remuneration Committees.

obtaining any advice or services shall be paid by the Company within the limits as authorised by the management board.

The Remuneration Committee is authorised to seek advice from the Sub-Remuneration-Committee where appropriate. The Remuneration Committee is authorised to invite the Head of risk management department of the Company and other Heads of internal control functions to attend at least one Remuneration Committee meeting per year.

The Remuneration Committee shall be responsible for the following tasks:

- 1) preparation of recommendations to the supervisory board, regarding the remuneration of the members of the management board as well as of the highest paid staff members in the Company;
- 2) directly overseeing the remuneration of Risk Takers being Head of risk management department, Head of compliance department and Head of internal audit department;
- 3) overseeing the decisions of the management board related to the bonus pool and (dis)approving the respective guidelines and conditions;
- 4) providing its support and advice to the supervisory board on the design and amendments of the remuneration policy;
- 5) reviewing the remuneration policy (at least annually) and approve and oversee its implementation;
- 6) reviewing the appointment of external remuneration consultants that the supervisory board, may decide to engage for advice or support, if necessary;
- 7) supporting the supervisory board in overseeing the remuneration system's design and operation on behalf of the supervisory board;
- 8) devoting specific attention to the assessment of the remuneration mechanisms adopted to ensure that the overall remuneration policy is consistent with the business strategy, objectives, values and interests of the Company and the investment funds it manages and the investors of such investment funds, and the remuneration system takes into account all types of risks and liquidity of the Company and the assets under management;
- 9) ensuring the regular independent review of the remuneration policy and systems by the Internal Audit;
- 10) formally reviewing a number of possible scenarios to test how the remuneration system will react to future external and internal events, and back test it as well.

The responsibility of setting the remuneration of the management board members rests with the supervisory board. For such competence the head or the deputy head of the supervisory board have been nominated. Pursuant to Section 30I of the Limited Liabilities Companies Act ("GmbHG") the supervisory board is authorized to represent the company in its legal matters with the members of the management board.

The Remuneration Committee holds meetings at least two times a year.

7. General principles

The general remuneration rules are applicable to all employees and management board members of the Company.

7.1 Salary components

The total regular base salary of a person can consist of several components. The total regular base salary is the sum of legal base salary, market, functional or leadership allowance and overtime allowance.

Job function allowance ("Funktionszulage"): The manager and Human Resources can decide to pay a job function allowance to an employee. Employees on non-management job positions are eligible for a job function allowance. A job function allowance can be used in various business situations. For example, external market pay pressures are considered to be temporary or organizational changes demand to market-based adjustments in relation to a specific job function. A job function allowance is limited to the duration of the specific function.

The function may be consumed by any extraordinary salary adjustment. As a guideline the function allowance should be maximum 25 % of the total regular base salary.

Leadership allowance ("Führungskräftezulage"): The manager can decide to pay a leadership allowance to an employee. Employees on management job position are eligible for a leadership allowance. A leadership allowance can be used in various business situations. For example, an appointment in the management function is for a limited time period. A leadership allowance is limited to the duration of the management function. As a guideline the leadership allowance should be maximum 25 % of the total regular base salary.

Overtime allowance: Overtime allowance is an amount to be granted to employees, who are required to be flexible and available outside the regular working hours. It is in general standardized at a value of between 10 and 25 hours per month and is paid 12 times per annum.

The number of hours included in the overtime has to be performed on a long term perspective; otherwise it must be revoked, since any eventual non-performance represents a lapse of preconditions for granting.

There are other types of allowances possible. Other allowances: The employee can receive other type of cash allowances. Examples of such allowances are: car allowance, expatriate allowance, housing allowance, school tuition allowance. All these allowances are bound to specific guidelines and rules.

Overtime pay: An employee can receive additional pay for overtime performed. In general an employee with overtime allowance will not receive additional pay for overtime.

Remuneration element	Attract	Competence building	Performance	Retention	Physical/ social security
Base salary	X	X		X	X

Allowances		X		X	
Variable Remuneration Schemes			X		
Retention Bonus				X	
Benefits (monetary and non-monetary)	X			X	X

7.2 Severance pay

Payments relating to the early termination of a contract shall be in accordance with the Company's business strategy, values and long-term goals as well as with relevant local legislation and applicable collective agreements.

Severance payments must reflect performance achieved over time and must not reward failure or misconduct. Severance pay should not be awarded where a staff member resigns voluntarily².

Where severance pay is awarded, the reasons for the severance payment, the appropriateness of the amount awarded and the criteria used to determine the amount, including that it is linked to the performance achieved over time and that it does not reward failure or misconduct, must be documented.

Severance payments may include redundancy remuneration for loss of office, and may be subject to a non-competition clause in the contract. In particular, in the following situations, additional payments made, because of the early termination of a contract, should be considered as severance payment:

- a. the institution terminates the contracts of staff because of a failure of the institution;
- b. the institution wants to terminate the contract following a material reduction of the institution's activities in which the staff member was active in or where business areas are acquired by other institutions without the option for staff to stay employed in the acquiring institution;
- c. the institution and a staff member agree on a settlement in case of a potential or actual labour dispute, to avoid a decision on a settlement by the courts.

Severance payments should be considered as variable remuneration. The following amounts of severance payments should not be taken into account for the purpose of the calculation of the ratio of fixed and variable remuneration and for the application of deferral and the pay out in instruments:

- a. severance payments mandatory under national labour law, mandatory following a decision of a court;
- b. settlements made for the loss of office where they are subject to a non-competition clause ('gardening leave') in the contract and paid out in future periods up to the amount of the

² unless a severance payment is required by national labour law in such case.

fixed remuneration which would have been paid for the non-competition period, if staff were still employed;

- c. the severance payment, in connection with a mutual termination upon initiative of the employer based on the agreement with the Worker's Council or in connection with a semi-retirement scheme is granted to an employee who has not been qualified as Material Risk Taker, in the year of the termination of employment nor in the previous year, based on any criteria (qualitative or quantitative);
- d. The amount of severance payment is calculated using a predefined generic formula set within the remuneration policy in the cases referred to in points 1 to 3 in this section;
- e. severance payments, not fulfilling the condition in point (a) of this paragraph, where the institution has demonstrated to the competent authority the reasons and the appropriateness of the amount of the severance payment.

Regular remuneration payments related to the duration of a notice period are not considered as severance payments.

7.3 Principle of proportionality

AIFMG enables management companies to apply the principle of proportionality with respect to the application of regulatory requirements related to remuneration.

The Company has decided to refrain from applying the principle of proportionality.

7.4 Disclosure of information

The Company will disclose the following information on remuneration policies and practices within their annual reports or in a separate document:

- 1) the total amount of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration, paid by the Company to its staff and number of beneficiaries and, where relevant, carried interest and performance fees paid by the investment funds;
- 2) the aggregate amount of remuneration broken down to those employees, including all board members, senior management, risk takers, employees with control functions and employees, who are in the same income bracket as the board members and senior managers on account of their total remuneration, whose activities have a significant impact on the risk profiles of the Company or the AIF managed by the Company.

7.5 Consistence with an effective risk management

Remuneration rules laid out in this policy have been designed to be consistent with and to promote sound and effective risk management and to discourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk strategies of the Company and the risk profiles (rules or instruments of incorporation) of the investment funds managed.³ Remuneration principles within this Remuneration Policy are designed to account for economic long-term interests of investors and as well social interests.

³ annex 2 no 1 lit at to Art 11 AIFMG.

7.6 Avoidance of conflicts of interest

This remuneration policy is in line with the business strategies, objectives, values and interests of the Company and the investment funds it manages as well as the investors of its investment funds, and includes measures to avoid conflicts of interest. Hence the management board of the Company ensures that the remuneration principles and processes are designed in a way that all employees' decisions are in line with the best interests of the investors (cf. FMA Circular conflicts of interests). This will be guaranteed by, among other things, the use of risk adjusted performance indicators which consider qualitative criteria as well (e.g. compliance breaches, violation of limits).

7.7 General guidelines to fixed remuneration

7.7.1 Fixed remuneration

All employees' fixed remuneration represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow for financial independence of variable remuneration on an individual level, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component. The individual employee proportion of fixed and variable remuneration does not promote extensive risk-taking.

The fixed remuneration:

- 1) Balances the value of the job, competences, experiences and the distinctive market competitive contributions of an employee;
- 2) Is the necessity to balance the responsibilities, knowledge, skills and experience required in job positions and of the employees (the market value of the job and the person);
- 3) Supports the work environment in the Company in terms of
 - a) performance (stretched targets, results achievement, feedback),
 - b) development (career, employability), and
 - c) core competencies (foster growth, act responsibly, be accountable, excel in execution, cooperate as a team);
- 4) Aims at being cost-competitive on the external market and has cost-flexibility components to follow organizational changes in the institution and supply and demand developments in the labour market; and
- 5) Considers the binding regulations of the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement (if any).

The fixed and variable remuneration may consist of different elements, including ancillary allowances, payments or benefits. The Company analyzes the type of these ancillary compensation and benefits and allocates them to the fixed or variable component of remuneration. The allocation is based on the criteria as mentioned below. Fixed remuneration is the sum of the fixed salary components and benefits.

7.7.2 Guidelines for determining fix remuneration components

Remuneration is fix, if payments are non-revocable, cannot be reduced, suspended or cancelled by the Company and do not depend on performance.

Remuneration is fixed where the conditions for its award and its amount:

- 1) are predetermined (i.e. based on a Collective Labour Agreement);

- 2) are non-discretionary (i.e. all employees receive at least a fixed remuneration);
- 3) are transparent to staff (i.e. the staff is informed formally about the fixed remuneration components);
- 4) are permanent i.e. maintained over a period tied to the specific role and organisational responsibilities;
- 5) are only changed through relevant policy change, via Collective Bargaining Agreement or following renegotiation in line with national legislation.
- 6) do not provide incentives for risk taking; and
- 7) are without prejudice of national law.

The following remuneration components (often a type of allowance or other ancillary compensation or benefits component) are also to be considered as fixed:

- 1) allowance/ancillary benefit is tied to a role or organisational responsibility and awarded as long as no material changes happen regarding the responsibilities and authorities of the role so that in fact the staff would have a different role or organisational responsibility;
- 2) amount does not depend on any other factors than fulfilling a certain role or having a certain organisational responsibility;
- 3) any other staff member fulfilling the same role or having the same organisational responsibility and who is in a comparable situation could be entitled to a comparable allowance/ancillary benefit;
- 4) Remuneration paid to expatriated staff considering the cost of living in a different state, where all similar situations are treated in a consistent way;
- 5) Allowances/ancillary benefits used to increase the base salary in situations where employees work abroad and receive less remuneration than would be paid on the local employment market for this position where all of the following conditions are met:
 - a) allowance can be paid on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees;
 - b) allowance is awarded because employees work temporarily abroad or in a different position with a remuneration level requiring adjustment from the contractual one to reflect pay levels in the relevant market;
 - c) level of additional payments is based on predetermined criteria;
 - d) duration of the allowance is tied to the duration of the situation.
- 6) One-time payments based on collective agreement or other mandatory regulations;
- 7) Other ancillary benefits based on collective agreement or other mandatory regulations (e.g. pension-fund contributions).

Included in the category of fixed remuneration are also remuneration components that:

- 1) are awarded in a non-discretionary way to staff;
- 2) do not depend on performance and do not pose incentive effects in terms of risk assumption, or payments based on legal obligations – that is mandatory under national law. Examples are leadership and market allowances.

This includes payments which form part of routine employment packages and which are solely linked to the family or personal situation like childcare, proportionate regular pension contributions on top of the mandatory regime, travel allowance and health insurance.

7.7.3 Employee participation

We Share by Erste Group

Under the employee share program WeShare by Erste Group, all employees who are in active employment in a participating entity starting from 2021 as of the last day of the respective financial year and who have been employed for more than 6 months at the end of the performance year receive shares of Erste Group Bank AG with a net equivalent value approved annually by the Management Board of the company (in addition to their fixed and variable remuneration).

This benefit does not substitute the contractual salary or any bonus but is granted in addition.

Additionally as part of the employee share program employees are entitled to benefits if the employees commit a personal investment in Erste Group Shares. The structure of the benefits is described in more detail in the local works agreements and local remuneration policies of the respective institution.

The Employee Share Program is only awarded when Group and Local Banks meet all "RAS" capital and liquidity requirements and Holding pays dividends and EAM Group meets its minimum profitability requirements..

Erste Mitarbeiterbeteiligung Privatstiftung will act as a trustee for the employees for the shares awarded under the ESP.

Employees are the beneficial owners of the shares and are entitled to dividend income, but Erste Mitarbeiterbeteiligung Privatstiftung exercises the voting rights for a minimum period of 5 years.

7.8 Guidelines on variable remuneration

7.8.1 General guidelines on variable remuneration

Calculation of variable remuneration

Minimum profitability requirements are defined for the Company. In scope are the conditions for pay-out of both upfront and deferred variable remuneration components. In case of performance related remuneration, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual as well as the business unit or investment funds concerned and of the overall results of the Company.

Furthermore, when assessing individual performance, financial as well as non-financial criteria are taken into account. These criteria are determined within this policy.

Performance and long-term sustainability

The variable remuneration of employees depends on the assessment of the performance and development of the individual and of the business unit concerned combined with the overall

performance of the Company or of the investment funds they manage. Business unit and individual performance is measured by quantitative and qualitative targets, including sustainability of an employee's efforts in the medium and long term.

The design of any variable remuneration policy, model and practice considers the guidelines as outlined below.

Any variable remuneration must be in line with the strategic indicators, values and long-term interests of the Company. Variable remuneration has to consider:

- 1) risk, capital, liquidity and probability as well as the time of realized profits of the Company;
- 2) performance of Erste Asset Management Group and the Company;
- 3) performance of the business unit (department/division/branch) concerned; and
- 4) performance of the individual.

The variable remuneration is linked to sustainability and does not promote excessive risk-taking. A variable remuneration shall only be paid out to the extent the ratio between the fixed and variable remuneration remains reasonable; the ratio variable/fixed remuneration is capped at 100% of the fixed remuneration for all employees and management board members.

Incentive structures for selected senior management and other identified staff are recommended to have ESG objectives in order to encourage behaviour consistent with the institutions' climate-related and environmental (risk) approach. Where the financial impacts of climate-related and environmental risks are difficult to quantify, the management body can consider incorporating appropriate qualitative criteria into the target setting. For more details on ESG related KPIs please refer to section "Environmental Social Governance (ESG)"

Failure shall never be rewarded. Therefore any binding commitments are avoided before all conditions for any component of variable remuneration are met.

In particular, variable remuneration must not be promised and has to relate to the performance in any particular performance period. As a rule, guaranteed variable remuneration is prohibited. The only exception is a sign-on bonus payment which can be paid out upfront in cash when hiring new staff. Such sign-on bonus payments must be approved by the management board of the Company and are limited to the first year of employment provided that the entity has solid and adequate equity and capital base. The sign-on bonus is not included in the calculation of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of the total remuneration for the first performance period, where the sign-on bonus is awarded when hiring new staff before the first performance period starts.

The employees and members of the management board do not decide about their own variable remuneration.

Environmental Social Governance (ESG)

For Erste Immobilien Kapitalanlagegesellschaft m.b.H. it is important that our sustainability efforts are perceived as a clear promise of value to our most important stakeholder groups and that these efforts meet their expectations. ESG related performance targets (KPIs) are the goals that meet current needs

without compromising the ability of the entity to generate profit in the future and which have an impact on the creation of medium/long-term value for stakeholders.

Our long-term strategic considerations regarding the financial resilience of Erste Group's business model while taking into account sustainability-related risks are based on a comprehensive analysis of climate-induced challenges and the legislative and economic impacts of climate change in our region. The European Climate Law, the EU's Green Deal and the Fit for 55 Package form the setting for future changes in EU strategy and legislation. All countries of the region will have to align with these European goals, manage their impact on their economies and adapt their investment and consumer expectations. ESG related KPIs are the goals that meet current needs without compromising the ability of the entity to generate profit in the future and which have an impact on the creation of medium/long-term value for stakeholders. ESG targets determined by the Group ESG office are an integral part of the scorecard structure of the management board.

EAM Group aligns its remuneration policies and practices with the overarching strategic objective to address ESG risks. The Remuneration Policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management, including by taking into account the institutions' risk appetite in terms of ESG risks.

Measurable ESG performance targets that include the treatment of ESG risks⁴ proposed by the experts of Group CEO, CFO, and CRO division, are translated into targets of the individual and considered in the scorecard structure of the management board, senior management, and other identified staff (material risk takers).

Diversity and inclusion

Equity is a key element of Erste's remuneration strategy and has an internal, an external and a diversity perspective. Internal equity means that employees should feel they are being rewarded fairly according to the relative value of their jobs within Erste Group. Employees engaged in similar jobs in different parts of our company should be rewarded equally. External equity means that Erste strives to reward employees competitively compared to those who are engaged in similar jobs in other organizations of the respective market and/or sector. Having a compensation structure based on competitive base pay is key.

All employees are entitled to fair and favorable working conditions with special focus on remuneration. In order to monitor and eliminate gender specific remuneration gaps, HR in each entity shall conduct an internal analysis on an annual basis and implement corrective measures to narrow gaps where they exist. Results and measures shall be shared and discussed with social partners and employee representatives⁵. Erste Group's remuneration policies and practices shall be gender neutral. "Gender neutral remuneration policy" means a remuneration policy based on equal pay for women and men for equal work or work of equal value.

Transparency of remuneration policies in relation to the integration of sustainability risks

The remuneration system described in this remuneration policy is conducive to an appropriate management of sustainability risks as defined by Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 and is in line with

⁵ Principle in alignment with the Group Diversity Policy, EG_CRO_A_0009, see Annex 8 ref. 22.

the sustainability strategies of the company. In connection with the consideration of sustainability risks in the remuneration policy of the company, particular care is taken to ensure that no excessive risk taking with regard to sustainability risks is encouraged and that the remuneration structure is linked to a risk-weighted performance (see point 8.1.). Accordingly, the consideration of sustainability risks in the investment process is incorporated into the performance assessment of the fund and portfolio management.

Risk, capital and liquidity requirements

Payment of variable components of remuneration as a whole may not limit the ability of the Company to strengthen its capital and liquidity base. Further, variable remuneration decisions by the members of the management board give due consideration to the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and employees of the Company in having a functional banking industry and financial market stability.

Board members

Management board members of the Company receive KPIs in the beginning of the performance period, which are aligned with the Chairman of the supervisory board. Taking these KPIs into account, the Remuneration Committee determines whether management board members are eligible for annual bonuses (a.k.a. short-term incentive plan) or any other variable remuneration scheme. The KPIs should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance long-term value. The total rewards potentially available should not be excessive. Any proposal for exception requires a supervisory board approval.

Control functions

The variable remuneration of the heads of control functions (business line level) is directly reviewed and approved by the Remuneration Committee. The business lines and/or teams that are overseen by the control function have no involvement in the decision making process that determines the compensation for the control functions. Control function compensation is not linked to the performance of the teams that they may oversee. Staff in control functions is compensated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.

Sub-Remuneration Committee

The variable remuneration model and practice for Risk Takers is to be approved by the Remuneration Committee after taking advice from a committee which consists of Risk Management, Human Resources ("HR"), Finance and Compliance ("Sub-Remuneration Committee"), which have an overview of the job responsibilities and performance requirements of the employee.

Incentive schemes and determination of the bonus pool

Incentive schemes

There are several incentive schemes. The implementation of any new incentive scheme needs to be aligned with HR. The Compliance function needs to be involved as an advisor in the design of a new incentive scheme. Any incentive scheme is approved by the management board of the

The management board of the Company decides about the bonus pool amount for the given performance period. The Remuneration Committee overviews these decisions and (dis)approves the guidelines and conditions related to the bonus pool.

Bonus payments and claw-back

Malus and clawback

Malus or clawback arrangements are explicit ex post risk adjustment mechanisms where the Company itself adjusts remuneration of the identified staff member based on such mechanisms (e.g. by lowering awarded cash remuneration or by reducing the number or value of instruments awarded).

In accordance with Article 94(1)(n) of CRD and without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration - taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned - is awarded only if it is sustainable considering the overall financial situation of the Company and justified on the basis of the performance of the Company, the business unit and the individual concerned. Should any of these criteria not allow for the full bonus to be awarded, up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements.

Provisions applicable to malus and clawback mechanisms

The Company reserves the right to claw back up to 100% of variable remuneration in cases where the staff member:

- (i) participated in or was responsible for conduct with intent or severe negligence or in cases of fraud which resulted in significant losses to the institution;
- (ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
- (iii) provided misleading information, if such information had or could reasonably have had an impact on the performance assessment;
- (iv) is dismissed by way of termination without notice period, according to the respective local law (in the valid constitutional edition)

Especially in cases (i) and (iv), no variable remuneration shall be awarded or paid out to affected employees, including deferred and retained parts of the total variable remuneration. Clawback mechanisms shall be applied to the upfront parts of the total variable remuneration.

Ex post adjustments to the total variable remuneration should always be performance or risk related. They should respond to the actual risk outcomes or changes to persisting risks of the institutions, business line or staff's activities.

The Company can clawback any variable remuneration paid within the last five years.

In such cases, the Company will use at least the initially used performance and risk criteria to ensure a link to the initial performance measurement. In addition to the criteria set out above, the Company will use specific criteria including:

- a. evidence of misconduct or serious error by the staff member (e.g. breach of code of conduct and other internal rules, especially concerning risks);
- b. whether the institution and/or the business unit subsequently suffers a significant downturn in its financial performance (e.g. specific business indicators);

- c. whether the institution and/or the business unit in which the identified staff member works suffers a significant failure of risk management;
- d. significant increases in the institution's or business unit's economic or regulatory capital base;
- e. any regulatory sanctions where the conduct of the identified staff member contributed to the sanction.

The decision of the occurrence of such an event, the application of malus and clawback arrangements itself and the limitation of the payout is taken by the Management Board or Remuneration Committee of the Company.

Malus and clawback arrangements should lead to a reduction of the variable remuneration where appropriate. Under no circumstances should an explicit ex post risk adjustment lead to an increase of the initially awarded variable remuneration or, where malus or clawback was already applied in the past, to an increase of the reduced variable remuneration.

Bonus payment in instruments

When variable remuneration is paid in instruments such as phantom shares, certificates, PSUs or other instruments, then the instruments remain with the Company. Variable remuneration shall not be paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate avoidance of the applicable legal requirements.

The rights to execute the instrument remain with the Company upon transmitting the instrument to the employee. In general, when instruments are used and transmitted to the employee, local vesting rules may be applied. The Company follows the regulatory guidelines in the decision-making processes where applicable regarding variable payments.

Non-monetary bonus

The conditions set out in this policy and in the remuneration practices also apply to non-monetary bonus or incentives (such as holiday trips, presents). (Non-) Monetary bonus and incentives, as far as permitted by law, paid by third parties need to be reported to the Compliance function.

No rights before granting

Neither this policy nor any other document related to this policy neither any variable remuneration under this or in connection with this policy shall entail any obligation of the Company. It shall not create any claim, right or entitlement of any employee to any variable remuneration.

The variable remuneration for a specific performance period grant on the day the employee receives the last instalment, either in cash or allocated, of the variable remuneration for the specific performance period. All variable remuneration payments until granting are upfront payments to a bonus entitlement and depend on an assessment made by the Remuneration Committee before the last instalment becomes due.

Thus, until granting, it is in the full discretion of the Remuneration Committee to decide on payments.

Only if, for whatever reason, a court or another public authority comes to the conclusion that an employee has a right to variable remuneration under this policy or any document that relates to it before granting. The Company reserves the right to unilaterally change this policy in whatever sense.

Other regulatory limitations

The Austrian Financial Market Authority or any European or national regulator can order a limitation or stop of variable remuneration. Thus, any decision on payment shall occur only under reservation of the obligation of the Company to abstain from such payment if ordered by a competent authority.

7.8.2 General guidelines to objectives and targets

Objectives and target setting

For the purpose of performance evaluation all employees must receive objectives and targets for a performance period. The objectives and targets describe the expected results. The objectives and target setting process is linked to the overall performance management process and guidelines of the Company.

Each objective and target is agreed between employee and superior. The objectives consist of an appropriate balance of quantitative and qualitative criteria. Objectives and targets are to be influenced through decisions and work by the employee.

The evaluation of objectives and targets is documented. The evaluation of objectives and targets is always between a superior (line and/or matrix) and employee. In addition, the evaluation process can be performed by appraisal committee.

An appraisal committee consists of members, which have an overview of the job responsibilities and performance requirements of the employee. The superior of the employee presents the performance and future fitness of the employee. The appraisal committee provides further performance and development feedback about the employee. This feedback relates to: specific business target achievement(s), leadership challenges and styles, development areas for the future, assessment to fitness of the employee for the future. Further, the appraisal committee decides about the final performance rating on the performance, leadership and fitness of the employee.

The total evaluation of the employees' performance needs to be at least "met expectations" for the employee to be eligible to receive a variable remuneration.

Objectives and targets for control staff

Employees engaged in internal control functions (internal audit, compliance and risk management) shall be independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business units they control.

7.8.3 Guidelines for the design of variable remuneration policies and practices

Any proposal for amendments on this Remuneration Policy and incentive scheme are designed with at least the involvement of the HR and Compliance function. The design of any variable remuneration policy and practice needs to be compliant with the applicable regulations and laws.

Regulations of discretionary pension benefits

The Company does not warrant discretionary pension benefits and there are no contractual pension schemes in place.

Remuneration in cases of subdued or negative financial performance

The minimum profitability requirement is a criterion for paying a bonus for all employees for a performance period. The minimum profitability requirement is also a criterion for paying deferral elements of retained bonus amounts for Risk Takers. It is based on at least two indicators, which both have to be met:

- 1) Financial results of the Company; and
- 2) Capital ratio of the Company.

The Remuneration Committee approves the respective minimum profitability requirements of the Company.

Variable Remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vested only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the Company and justified according to the performance of the business unit, the investment funds and the individual concerned. Usually, a subdued or negative financial performance of the Company or of the investment funds concerned leads to a significant reduction of the entire variable remuneration of the Company. Thereby, capital requirements shall be given priority over any possible payment of variable remuneration.

Rules against circumvention

Variable remuneration is not paid through instruments or methods that facilitate the avoidance of the requirements of the remuneration policy at hand. The adherence to this requirement is also part of the annual review conducted by the respective remuneration committee.

Multi-year framework for assessment of performance

The assessment of the performance of Risk Takers is set in a multi-year framework appropriate to the life-cycle of the investment funds managed by the Company in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on long-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the redemption policy of the investment funds it manages and their investment risk. This alignment is part of the annual appraisal interview with Risk Takers.

Bonus payment model

Minimum profitability requirements are the Company's wide conditions for pay-out of any upfront and deferred variable remuneration.

7.9 Guidelines for staffing and mobility

The Remuneration Committee is informed about any career moves of a Risk Taker. The Remuneration Committee makes a decision regarding the treatment of dealing with the performance assessment and bonus payment.

The following guidelines apply in case of staffing and career moves:

- 1) An employee is a Risk Taker during the performance period, if the employee is determined as a Risk Taker within the Company for a period of at least 3 months. Any granted bonus amount is paid according to the bonus payment model for Risk Takers;
- 2) The payment of deferred bonus parts remains the responsibility of the Company the bonus amount was granted. In case a Risk Taker makes a career move to another company these

deferred bonus parts are granted and paid according to bonus payment conditions applicable for Risk Takers;

- 3) A Risk Taker can receive a guaranteed bonus as a sign-on bonus paid out upfront in cash when hired as a new employee. Such sign-on bonus payments are limited to the first year of employment in the entity and are subject to the condition the institute has solid and sufficient equity capital;
- 4) If a Risk Taker makes a career move within the Company and stays a Risk Taker then the applicable bonus payment model refers to the function which the Risk Taker held for at least 6 months.
- 5) If a Risk Taker becomes an expatriate then the home country continues with the payment of variable remuneration as defined by the home country variable remuneration policy.

If a Risk Taker leaves a job position and would in the new job position within the Company not be recognized as a Risk Taker then the respective Remuneration Committee takes the decision regarding the treatment of the objectives and bonus payment.

7.10 Personal hedging, interest and dividends

A Risk Taker is prohibited to use personal hedging strategies or agree on an insurance to transfer the downside risks of deferred and retained parts of the variable remuneration to another internal or external party.

Neither interest nor dividends will be paid out on deferred or retained parts of remuneration and no dividends will be paid on phantom fund shares.

7.11 Risk adjusted performance measurement

7.11.1 Quantitative Criteria (Knock-in)

Risk limits are defined for real estate funds. If these limits are exceeded, a full bonus reduction is made for those responsible (risk takers).

In order to be entitled to a variable remuneration, the following quantitative criteria must be met for each fund.

Compliance with

- market risk limit
- liquidity risk limit
- volatility risk limit
- real estate risk limit

7.11.2 Qualitative Criteria (Knock-out)

The qualitative criteria serve as knock-out criteria for all employees and the management board members of the Company and also for those employees and management board members who otherwise would have been entitled to receive variable remuneration by having met the knock-in criteria. They will lose at least part of the bonus if any of the below mentioned principle is violated:

Each violation of a compliance rule causes bonus cut of up to 100 % per violation (depending on how severe the violation is).

The relevant figures are monitored by the competent Risk Management Division / Compliance Officer and reported to the Sub-Remuneration-Committee.

Knock-in and knock-out criteria are overseen by the Sub-Remuneration Committee and the Remuneration Committee. This report also includes a general review of both the general implementation of the principles laid out in this policy as well as bonus payments to Risk Takers. Furthermore this report will contain information on payment of variable remuneration and all information required for disclosure. The Remuneration Committee will aggregate the information received and amend it with information required to enable the Company to carry out its Governance Function.

8. Specific remuneration principles

The specific remuneration principles are applicable for the variable remuneration of Risk Takers.

8.1 Calculation of variable remuneration

The payout of the variable remuneration of Risk Takers follows the principles set out in this Remuneration Policy and encompasses the specifics for investment management companies. Adjustments of calculation of variable pay relate, above all, to the risk adjusted performance measurement, as specified further down below, which provides for the alignment of the remuneration of fund managers with the risk profiles as well as investment strategy of the investment funds they manage.

The link between the performance of an investment fund managed by a specific fund manager and his/her variable remuneration is incorporated by goals set in the annual appraisal interviews with the respective employee and is tailored to the requirements by the specific investment fund. Moreover, the performance evaluation for fund managers takes into account the life-cycle of the AIF managed and, thus, constitutes long-term assessments of performance as detailed further down below.

8.2 Deferral period

40 % of the variable remuneration component is deferred in equal instalments over a period of 3 years. Thus, 60% of the variable remuneration is paid out in the year following the performance period as an upfront payment, unless the amount of the overall bonus exceeds EUR 150,000⁶. In this case, 60 % of the variable remuneration component is deferred.

Before paying out the deferred part, a reassessment of the performance and, if necessary, a risk adjustment is performed in order to align variable remuneration to risks and errors in the performance and risk assessments that have appeared since the staff members were awarded their variable remuneration component.

⁶ See FMA Rundschreiben Grundsätze der Vergütungspolitik und -praktiken S. 21 Rz 64.

8.3 Non-cash instruments

50 % of any variable remuneration for Risk Takers who are directly involved in fund or transaction management including management board members and heads of branches will consist of shares of the AIF or AIF linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments. To avoid a misalignment of interests which arise in relation to Risk Takers who are not directly involved in portfolio management the requirement to pay out in units or shares of the AIF or AIF linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments does only apply to employees which are directly involved in fund or portfolio management including management board members (marginal note 132 and 133 of the ESMA GL AIFM Remuneration).

The Company does not issue any instruments viable as non-cash components other as AIF funds or AIF linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments, they will not use other non-cash instruments in its payment model.

However, pursuant to the FMA Circular⁷ in case of deviating national supervisory laws those national laws shall prevail. The measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes a comprehensive adjustment mechanism to integrate all relevant types of current and future risks.

Due to legal and/or contractual restriction shares in AIFs set up as special funds (Spezialfonds) are not used in the pay-out process. These considerations regarding pay-out in shares in special funds will not apply in cases the national legal provisions allow for the use of shares in special funds for the purpose of variable remuneration.

Due to the fact that the payment of variable remuneration in shares of the AIF or AIF linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments is mandatory, any payment in instruments will not be neutralized. After disbursement of variable remuneration in shares of the AIF the requirement for a retention period pursuant to marginal notes 137ff, page 29, ESMA GL AIFM Remuneration will be applied. Therefore, employees are not allowed to sell shares in AIF received during the retention period of one year for Risk Takers, which receive variable remuneration in shares of AIF. When variable remuneration is paid in phantom-like instruments then the instruments remain with the Company. The pay-out of the phantom-like instrument is, after the expiry of the retention period, in cash.

8.3.1 Retention period

The purpose of a retention period is to align the instruments with the longer term interests of the Company and is linked to a multi-year performance assessment. The retention period starts on the date of allocation and is for the period of one calendar year. Legal requirements of respective Financial Market Authorities can require longer retention period. During the retention period only the value of the allocated instrument might change.

The allocation itself is not changed except for claw-back reasons.

8.3.2 Phantom share plan

The non-cash-instruments for Risk Takers who are directly involved in fund or portfolio management including management board members are affected in phantom fund shares. After the performance period the number of phantom fund shares to be allocated is calculated in the following way: 50% of the gross bonus amount is divided by the average weighted daily NAV of

⁷ See FMA Rundschreiben Grundsätze der Vergütungspolitik und -praktiken S. 7 Rz 15.

the respective fund shares during the performance period (year n). The result constitutes the total number of phantom fund shares.

The average weighted daily NAV is calculated by risk management of the Company with respect to the IAIFM regulations.

The phantom fund shares are never transmitted to the employee. Phantom fund shares remain with the Company. After the retention period, the fund shares are converted into cash by multiplication with the average weighted daily NAV of the year following performance period (year n+1) and paid in cash equivalent.

8.4 Significance threshold

In line with the FMA Guidance given in its Circular⁸ Remuneration Committee defined and implemented a significance threshold amounting to EUR 50,000.— or 50 % of Risk Taker's fixed annual salary, whichever is lower, as bonuses below this significance threshold do not encourage employees to take on excessive risk. Therefore, variable compensation that is below the level of significance the specific remuneration principles set out in Article 11 Z 1 m) and n) to Annex 2 AIFMG is neutralized and, thus, need not be applied to those bonuses.

Considering the level of fixed remuneration in the Company and having regard to the level of remuneration in the industry, especially the remuneration in the industry in the company location, variable remuneration below the significance threshold is not suitable to encourage Risk Takers to risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk strategy of the Company and the risk profiles of the investment funds managed and does not interfere with the economic long-term interests of investors and as well social interests.

8.5 Example bonus payment

Example bonus payment model for Risk Takers

The total variable remuneration amount for the performance year 2015 is equal to 100.000,00.

60% = 60.000,00 are paid out/allocated to the employee in 2016, thereof 50% paid in cash and 50% transferred into phantom fund shares (average weighted daily NAV in 2015 is 29,90 = 1.003,34 phantom fund shares), the phantom fund shares are retained during the retention period of one year, converted into cash at average weighted daily NAV 2016 and paid out in 2017.

40% = 40.000,00 are deferred in equal instalments during the deferral period of three years (2017 to 2019), thereof 50% paid out in cash at 6.666,67 per year and 50% transferred into phantom fund shares (average weighted daily NAV 2015 is 29,90 = a total of phantom shares and 222,96 phantom fund shares per year), whereas each portion of phantom fund shares is retained during the retention period of one year, converted into cash at average weighted daily NAV of the respective prior year and paid out in 2018 to 2020.

Pay-out of cash parts:

2016: 30.000,00

⁸ FMA circular „06/2022 FMA-Rundschreiben zu §§ 17a-17c InvFG 2011 und § 11 AIFMG über Grundsätze der Vergütungspolitik und -praktiken (Neufassung November 2022)“

2017: 6.666,67

2018: 6.666,67

2019: 6.666,67

Pay-out of non-cash instruments in cash (e.g. phantom fund shares):

2017: 1.003,34 phantom fund shares x 30,40 € (average weighted daily NAV 2016) = 30.502,00

2018: 222,96 phantom fund shares x 36,00 € (average weighted daily NAV 2017) = 8.026,56

2019: 222,96 phantom fund shares x 33,00 € (average weighted daily NAV 2018) = 7.357,68

2020: 222,96 phantom fund shares x 29,00 € (average weighted daily NAV 2019) = 6.465,84

9. Guidelines for leavers

The payout of any deferred or retained variable remuneration of previous performance periods to employees is possible after the end of employment with the Company when:

- 1) employees retire from employment;
- 2) employees are made redundant by the employer or in mutual agreement between employee and employer.

The payout of variable remuneration (neither upfront, nor deferred or retained) to employees after the end of their employment with a company of Erste Group is not possible in case of:

- 1) employer termination with cause (e.g. violation of duties);
- 3) employees (including material risk takers) terminate and work for the competitor, where this results in breach of post-contractual non-competition clause in the contract, or employees (including material risk takers) terminate and work for the competitor, but do not have a non-competition clause in their contracts.

If any such employee with a deferred or retained variable payment has worked through a performance period and the employment ends during or after expiry of this performance period but before the end of the deferral period and the retention period, the payout of the variable remuneration will follow the same principles as in case of a continuing employment relationship with the Company. The respective remuneration scheme valid for the employee will be applied.

If the employment ends during the performance period, the employee can receive variable payments on a pro-rata basis. However, this paragraph does not in itself grant individual rights to material risk takers or other staff with deferred bonus payments.

In the unfortunate case of the demise of an employee prior to the payout of any deferred or retained bonus of previous performance periods the above mentioned provisions apply. Variable payments which were awarded until the time of death and are not yet paid out may be effected to dependents or passed into the heritage according to national jurisdiction.

Annex 1 Rules for Preparation of Materials and Agenda Points Submitted to the Remuneration Committee

Overview of remuneration related matters

The following table includes a non-exhaustive overview of the topics which need to be dealt with by the Remuneration Committee of an entity:

	Main responsibilities of a Remuneration Committee	Action required from the Remuneration Committee
1)	Determining the remuneration strategy for top executive staff, material risk takers and heads of control functions	Approval
2)	Approval of the remuneration model and practice for all employees (e.g. thresholds for the bonus pay-out, type of share linked instrument, balance between fixed and variable remuneration)	Approval
3)	Approval on the guidelines and conditions related to the bonus pool	Approval
4)	Approval on the minimum performance requirements of an institution to allow the pay-out of annual bonus and deferral payments	Approval
5)	Setting and evaluation of performance objectives (KPIs) of the members of the Management Board for the respective performance period	Approval
6)	Overseeing the remuneration paid to Material Risk Takers and heads of control functions ⁹ (including approval of claw-backs and the limitation on the pay-out, if applicable)	Approval
7)	Performance-related bonus amounts proposed for the members of the Management Board for the respective performance period	Recommendation to Supervisory Board
8)	Payments to members of the Management Board related to early termination	Recommendation to Supervisory Board
9)	Approval of the lists of employees identified as material risk takers, including approval of any subsequent material exemptions made for individual staff members	Approval
10)	Approval of the general principles of the remuneration policy (periodical review)	Approval
11)	Approval of notifications to the competent authorities, if required	Approval

Annex 2 Remuneration of the Members of Supervisory Boards

The supervisory board is responsible for supervising the management board and overseeing the respective institution's strategic direction and risk management. As such, it is important to have a well-designed remuneration policy that aligns with the respective institution's overall objectives and ensures that appropriate remuneration is in place for the supervisory board members.

This remuneration policy applies to remuneration awarded based on mandates on supervisory boards, advisory boards or similar bodies in affiliated companies of Erste Group (internal supervisory board mandates) as well as mandates in companies not affiliated with Erste Group, where mandates are assumed in direct relation to or as part of the employment or mandate within the Erste Group (external supervisory board mandates).

Remuneration Principles

1. Independence: The remuneration must not interfere with the independence of the supervisory board members. It does not create any conflicts of interest or compromise their ability to act in the best interests of the respective institution. The remuneration for members of the supervisory board is always fixed meaning that members of the supervisory board do not receive any variable remuneration based on their supervisory board role. No performance-related remuneration is paid to supervisory board members, nor are any pension rights accrued.
2. Transparency: The remuneration should be transparent and easy to understand. Depending on legal and regulatory requirements applicable to the specific entity, supervisory board remuneration is decided and reported to the shareholders and disclosed as required.
3. Market competitiveness: The remuneration should be competitive with that of similar positions in other companies. This will help attract talented individuals who can contribute to the respective institution's success, taking into consideration the institution's size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.

Remuneration Governance

The remuneration policy for supervisory board members should be designed and overseen by the respective institution's remuneration committee. The remuneration committee should review the policy periodically to ensure that it remains effective and aligned with the respective institution's overall objectives, considering the institution's size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.

Remuneration Structure

The remuneration package consists of the following components and is paid to the supervisory board members by the :

- 1) Fixed remuneration is paid to the supervisory board members for their time and expertise. It is paid proportionally for the time period (calendar based) the respective supervisory board member exercised his/her mandate. Fixed remuneration is only paid to appointed members of the supervisory board; guests are excluded from receiving a fixed remuneration. Fixed remuneration can be paid out in cash and/or instruments (e.g. shares).
- 2) Attendance fee (per meeting); eligibility depends on the presence at the supervisory board and committee meetings. The member needs to attend more than 50% of the meeting to be eligible for the attendance fee pay-out for that meeting.
- 3) Reimbursement for cash expenses may include, according to respective regulations:
 - a) Daily allowances to cover additional expenses for living away from someone's own residence

- b) Travel expenses and accomodation
 - c) Reimbursement of enrolment fees, travel expenses and accommodation for regulatory trainings.
- 4) Directors and officers (D&O) financial liability insurance benefit (for all members of the supervisory board, including representatives of the Workers Council).

Futher Rules

- 1) Supervisory board members who are nominated by the shareholders and simultaneously are in an employment relationship with Erste Group institutions are not eligible for receiving supervisory board remuneration.
- 2) Insofar as an Erste Group employee assumes additional internal supervisory board mandate, total remuneration from the additional mandate shall not be paid out. This rule is also applicable analogously to elected members of the Employees' Council who are delegated to the supervisory board of an entity.
- 3) Insofar as an Erste Group employee assumes additional external supervisory board mandates as part of their role in Erste Group, the total remuneration from these additional mandates shall not be paid out, or in case they are paid out, these amounts shall be deducted from his/her remuneration.
- 4) Loans or other guarantees may be granted based on rules for (supervisory) board members.
- 5) No benefits upon termination of the service as a member of the supervisory board are provided.
- 6) Supervisory board members are solely responsible for compliance with their tax obligations in relation to remuneration based on their supervisory board role. Erste Group supports supervisory board members upon request by supervisory board members in tax compliance matters arising in direct relation to their supervisory board mandates.

